Civil Rights

June 10, 2016

Deadlocked Supreme Court Affirms Appellate Court Ruling on Public Sector Union Dues

A challenge to a state law mandating the payment of union fees by certain public employees met with an unusual, if not unexpected, end in March. The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in January 2016 in Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Assoc., and observers at the time suggested that the court seemed to be leaning toward striking down the law in question. The death of Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia in February, however, left the court evenly divided, politically speaking. The court tied 4-4 and therefore had to allow the lower court ruling to stand. Friedrichs, 578 U.S. ___ (2016).The plaintiffs alleged that a law requiring them to pay union fees even if they were not union members violated their First Amendment rights. This type of arrangement is often known as a “fair share provision,” since employees who are not union members still benefit from a union’s collective bargaining activities. Employers with fair share provisions are known as “agency shops.” When an employer enters into a contract with a union that requires all employees to join the union if they are not already members, and to remain members for the duration of their employment, this is known as a “union shop.”

Some states have enacted laws that prohibit union shops and agency shops. Supporters of these laws call them “right to work” laws, while critics often call them “right to work for less” laws. One argument in favor of requiring union membership or the payment of a fee is that it reduces the problem of “free riders,” an economic term referring to people who benefit from something, such as collective bargaining agreements, without paying for them.

April 29, 2016

New Jersey Police Officer’s Lawsuit Challenges Loss of Pay, Claims Violations of Rights

by Resnick Law Group, P.C.

A lawsuit pending in a New Jersey Superior Court seeks review of a township’s decision to dock the plaintiff’s pay by 60 hours, resulting in a loss of about $3,500. O’Hare v. Township of Morris, et al., No. L-000710-16, complaint (N.J. Super. Ct., Morris Co., Mar. 24, 2016). The plaintiff, a police officer, made negative comments about a township official in an email sent to members of the police officers’ union, and he was brought up on disciplinary charges as a result. The plaintiff’s lawsuit alleges that his comments are protected by the First Amendment and laws protecting union activities.

Federal laws and laws in many states protect the rights of workers to form and join organizations, commonly known as unions, for the purpose of collective bargaining with their employers. New Jersey law guarantees the right of most public employees “to form, join and assist any employee organization.” N.J. Rev. Stat. § 34:13A-5.3. The federal National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) extends these rights to many private-sector employees, along with the right to engage in “concerted activities” related to labor organizing. 29 U.S.C. § 157.

The rights protected by the NLRA and similar statutes generally include discussions and other communications among employees regarding negotiations with employers. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution extends much broader protections against restriction or retribution by the government based on the content of speech. See, e.g. Sable Commc’ns of Cal. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989).

February 19, 2016

New Jersey Lawsuits Allege Discrimination for Flu Shot Refusals

by Resnick Law Group, P.C.

Winter and spring are “flu season” throughout the U.S. and much of the world, and millions of people obtain flu vaccine shots in order to obtain some protection against the disease. Influenza, or the “flu,” can be a very serious disease. The health care industry has required employees to obtain annual flu shots for some time, but other employers have also begun to require flu shots. Some people cannot get flu shots for medical reasons, and others decline them for a variety of personal reasons. Several recent lawsuits have considered whether New Jersey law prohibits employers from taking adverse action against an employee who refuses to get a flu shot, based on various theories of religious discrimination.

For most people, a case of the flu means a few miserable days in bed, but it can mean hospitalization or even death for some. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Protection (CDC), the annual death toll from 1976 to 2007 ranged from a low of around 3,000 to a high of close to 49,000 in a single season. The vast majority of fatalities are people who are 65 years old or older.

Preparing a vaccine against seasonal influenza, the type of the disease that rears its head during the winter and spring months, is difficult, since it requires advance predictions of which strains are most likely to appear. Unlike vaccines for childhood diseases like measles and whooping cough, a flu vaccine obtained one year is not likely to provide protection beyond that year. It is also not guaranteed to prevent the flu. It only bolsters the immune system.

October 27, 2015

New Jersey Appellate Court Rules on Enforceability of Employee Arbitration Agreements

by Resnick Law Group, P.C.

Arbitration clauses, by which the parties to a contract agree to submit disputes to an arbitrator or arbitration panel before filing suit, or in lieu of litigation entirely, are becoming increasingly common in both consumer and employment contracts. Arbitration is a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) that has some similarities to the litigation process, but it is conducted almost entirely outside the court system. The New Jersey Appellate Division recently issued a ruling that clarifies the requirements for the validity of an arbitration clause in an employment contract, holding that the clause must state a “clear and unmistakable” waiver of an employee’s right to a jury trial. Milloul v. Knight Capital Group, et al., No. A-1953-13T2, slip op. at 15 (N.J. App., Sep. 1, 2015).

New Jersey courts, as a matter of policy, encourage litigants and prospective litigants to use arbitration and other ADR methods. The New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:23B-1 et seq., sets basic guidelines for arbitration. A neutral third party, known as an arbitrator, reviews both sides’ claims and defenses, and he or she may conduct a proceeding that is similar to a trial before rendering a decision. Arbitrators are often former judges with experience in conducting trials, as well as training and certification through various private arbitration organizations. State and federal laws do not require licensing for arbitrators the way they do for attorneys and other professionals, although courts may set their own criteria.

Some arbitration clauses state that the result of an arbitration is binding on the parties. In that case, a court’s authority over the matter is limited to ratifying the arbitration decision, unless it finds evidence of fraud, bias, or misconduct during the arbitration process. See N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 2A:23B-22, 23, 24. When an arbitration clause appears in an employment contract, much as when one appears in a consumer contract, the employee is often not in a position to negotiate the details of the clause, due to both a lack of bargaining power and a lack of understanding of what the clause means. Arbitration clauses are the subject of much criticism, partly because of this disadvantage.

September 18, 2015

The Americans with Disabilities Act, Which Protects New Jersey Workers Against Employment Discrimination, Turns 25

by Resnick Law Group, P.C.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recently celebrated the 25th anniversary of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The ADA helps ensure that people with disabilities have access to public buildings, public transportation, and private businesses considered “public accommodations.” It also protects disabled workers against discrimination and requires employers to provide them with reasonable accommodations. The difficulty tends to come in the applicability of the ADA’s definition of “disabled” to a particular worker, or the reasonableness of a requested accommodation under its specific circumstances. It is worth taking a moment to review the ADA and the ways it has been interpreted and adapted over the years.

In numerous ways, the ADA has literally changed the landscape of the country. Title II of the ADA requires government buildings and public transportation to allow access by disabled individuals. This might include wheelchair ramps, elevators, or assistance for people with impaired vision or hearing. Title III establishes similar requirements for “public accommodations”–private businesses that offer products or services to the general public, such as hotels, restaurants, theaters, grocery stores, gas stations, bus depots, libraries, parks, schools, day care centers, and golf courses. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Title IV requires telecommunications service providers to make services available to people with hearing and speech impairments. 47 U.S.C. § 225.

Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination based on disability. It also requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for disabled workers. Title V includes a prohibition on retaliation for asserting rights under any of the ADA’s provisions. Congress has added to the ADA’s protections with subsequent laws, such as the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act (ADAAA) and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), which both became law in 2008.
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July 31, 2015

Supreme Court Sides with Job Applicant in Religious Discrimination Claim

by Resnick Law Group, P.C.

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of a woman who claimed that a clothing retailer violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it turned down her job application. She specifically alleged that the retailer discriminated against her because she wore a headscarf as part of her religious practice as a Muslim, which the retailer claimed violated a policy on employee attire. The retailer claimed that she never requested a religious accommodation–such as an exception to the policy prohibiting headwear–and argued that it was not liable for any violation of her rights because it had no “actual knowledge” that she needed an accommodation. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the complainant only needed to prove that her need for a religious accommodation motivated the decision not to hire her. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n (EEOC) v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. ___ (2015).

The complainant was a teenager when she applied for a job at an Abercrombie & Fitch store in 2008. She wore a headscarf to her interview with an assistant manager at the store. The assistant manager determined that the complainant was qualified for the position. She was reportedly concerned, however, that the complainant’s headscarf violated the store’s “Look Policy,” which regulated how employees dress at work in an effort to maintain a consistent style across the retailer’s nationwide locations. The assistant manager took her concerns to the store manager, who stated that the headscarf violated the Look Policy and instructed the assistant manager not to hire the complainant.

The EEOC filed suit against the retailer in 2009 on the complainant’s behalf, alleging that the decision not to hire her was motivated by her religion, as signified by her headscarf, in violation of Title VII. A district court granted summary judgment for the EEOC on the question of liability. 798 F.Supp.2d 1272 (N.D. Ok. 2011). It awarded the complainant $20,000 in damages after a trial. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed these rulings and entered summary judgment for the defendant. It held that the defendant lacked “actual knowledge” of the complainant’s need for a religious accommodation because she failed to request it, and the defendant therefore could not be liable for religious discrimination under Title VII. 731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2013).
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April 2, 2015

Lawsuit Claims Gender Identity Discrimination under Title VII

by Resnick Law Group, P.C.

A transgender woman’s sex discrimination lawsuit examined the extent of protection, if any, offered for gender identity by federal anti-discrimination law. Jamal v. Saks & Company, No. 4:14-cv-02782, complaint (S.D. Tex., Sep. 30, 2014). Issues relating to transgender persons, generally defined as someone who identifies with a different gender than the one they were assigned at birth, have gained considerable prominence in recent years, particularly with regard to their rights against workplace and public discrimination. New Jersey and other states prohibit employment discrimination based on “gender identity or expression” N.J. Rev. Stat. § 10:5-12(a), but federal anti-discrimination laws do not expressly mention gender identity.

The defendant operates the Saks Fifth Avenue chain of department stores. The plaintiff, a transgender woman, first worked at an outlet store in suburban Houston, Texas until she was transferred to its “full-line store” in Houston. Jamal, complaint at 3. She alleges that the defendant routinely “misgendered” her by referring to her with male pronouns and other indicators, and denying permission to use the women’s restroom. The store manager allegedly requested that she “change her appearance to a more masculine one.” Id. at 5. Managers and fellow employees, the plaintiff claims, routinely harassed and belittled her on the basis of her gender identity. She complained to the EEOC, and was fired ten days later.

The plaintiff sued for wrongful termination, hostile work environment, harassment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. The defendant filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss in December 2014 that referred to the plaintiff as “he,” and used the term “[sic]” when quoting portions of the plaintiff’s complaint that used female pronouns. This term is used to indicate that quoted text includes errors or inaccuracies found in the original. The defendant later withdrew its motion, and the parties stipulated a dismissal of the lawsuit in March 2015. The questions it raised still remain, though.
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December 30, 2014

Federal Court Allows Police Whistleblower’s Lawsuit Against City Officials to Proceed

by Resnick Law Group, P.C.

A federal judge denied a motion to dismiss a police officer’s lawsuit against a Pennsylvania borough and multiple borough officials for alleged retaliation and civil rights violations. The plaintiff alleged retaliation for reporting fraud by the former police chief to state authorities. Beatty v. Ohioville Borough, et al, No. 2:14-cv-00067, 2nd am. complaint (W.D. Pa., Jul. 25, 2014). The police chief eventually pled guilty to theft and forgery for submitting fraudulent timesheets. Several defendants moved to dismiss the suit, arguing in part that they could not be sued in their official capacities. The court disagreed, finding that Congress intended to allow lawsuits to hold public officials individually liable for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The plaintiff is a part-time police officer in Ohioville Borough, Pennsylvania. He reportedly found evidence that the police chief was defrauding taxpayers and took this to the Pennsylvania State Police in August 2012. A criminal investigation led to allegations that the chief submitted fraudulent timesheets over a three-year period, costing taxpayers over $45,000. He was charged with 63 felony counts of forgery and one felony count of theft in February 2013. The Ohioville Borough Council voted unanimously in January 2014 to allow him to retire instead of firing him. He pled guilty to two misdemeanor counts of theft and forgery in September 2014.

While the police chief’s saga was unfolding, the plaintiff claims that he faced retaliation by borough officials, including the mayor, the assistant chief of police, the solicitor, and the members of the Borough Council. He claims that he was denied a promotion in August 2012, shortly after he went to the state police, and that he was suspended in October without good cause. The mayor allegedly “encouraged private citizens to file false and fraudulent complaints” against him during this time period. Beatty, complaint at 7. The plaintiff was suspended again in January 2013, allegedly without any explanation or opportunity to respond. He was placed back on the schedule again in March but suspended indefinitely on March 17 for reasons he claims were pretextual.
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September 30, 2014

U.S. Supreme Court Rules in Former Public Employee’s Favor in Whistleblower Retaliation Case

by Resnick Law Group, P.C.

A community college violated a program director’s First Amendment rights, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, when it fired him after he testified during an investigation of corruption in the program. Lane v. Franks, et al, 573 U.S. ___, No. 13-483, slip op. (Jun. 19, 2014). The court held that the plaintiff did not give up his rights under the First Amendment when he accepted public employment. It remanded the plaintiff’s case against the community college to the trial court for further proceedings, but it affirmed the lower courts’ findings that the college president, named as an individual defendant, had limited immunity for acts performed in an official capacity. Despite this, the case is an important victory for whistleblowers in the government.

The plaintiff, Edward Lane, was hired in 2006 as the Director of Community Intensive Training for Youth (CITY), a statewide program run through Central Alabama Community College (CACC) to assist underprivileged youth. CITY was facing serious financial problems at the time, according to the court’s opinion, which prompted Lane to audit the program’s expenses. He discovered about $177,000 paid to Democrat state representative Sue Schmitz between February 2003 and October 2006, with little record of any actual work done by her. When Schmitz reportedly refused Lane’s demand to show up for work at CITY’s office in Huntsville, Lane fired her. This allegedly drew threats of retaliation from Schmidt and the attention of the FBI.

In November 2006, Lane testified to a federal grand jury, which later indicted Schmidt on multiple counts of mail fraud and theft. Lane testified under subpoena at her trial in August 2008. When the jury failed to reach a verdict, prosecutors tried Schmidt again, and Lane testified again. Schmidt was convicted and sentenced to 30 months in prison. In January 2009, CACC President Steve Franks terminated 29 probationary CITY employees, including Lane, citing budget shortfalls. He then rescinded all but two of those terminations. Lane was one of the two who were not reinstated.
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May 13, 2014

Question of Whether Employers Can Fire Employees for Lawful Marijuana Use to Go Before Colorado Supreme Court

by Resnick Law Group, P.C.

An employee who relied on medical marijuana for debilitating pain lost his job after failing a drug test, and his case has raised the difficult question of whether moves towards marijuana decriminalization have changed the legal standards in cases of termination for marijuana use. The employee alleged that the employer violated a statute prohibiting termination for “lawful activity” outside of work, but the Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed in Coats v. DISH Network, L.L.C., 303 P.3d 147 (Col. App. 2013). The state supreme court has agreed to hear the employee’s appeal. The question involves both state and federal law, especially now that marijuana is at least partly legal in many states, but still illegal under federal law.

The plaintiff worked as a telephone operator for the satellite television service provider DISH Network. A spinal injury left him quadriplegic, and he obtained a prescription for medical marijuana to treat severe muscle spasms. Despite a good employment record, he was terminated in 2010 after failing a random drug test. He sued DISH, citing a Colorado statute that prohibits termination for “lawful activity off the premises of the employer during nonwork hours.” C.R.S. § 24-34-402.5 (PDF file).

Both the trial court and the appellate court ruled that marijuana use outside of work, even with a legal prescription, was not “lawful activity” within the meaning of the state statute. Marijuana use of any kind is still prohibited by federal law. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) that state laws allowing marijuana use do not supersede federal laws prohibiting it. For an activity to be “lawful” in a wrongful termination case, the Colorado court held, “it must be permitted by, and not contrary to, both state and federal law.” Coates, 303 P.3d at 151.
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