Articles Posted in Discrimination

A group of former male employees of a high-end Manhattan department store have filed a lawsuit alleging race and age discrimination against the store and its corporate parent. They claim that they were subjected to a hostile work environment because of their age or race, or both in some cases, and that the defendant unlawfully terminated their employment. Although the lawsuit is pending in a New York court, federal and New Jersey antidiscrimination laws provide a helpful comparison of varying levels of protection against age discrimination. New Jersey’s antidiscrimination statute provides broader protections than its federal counterpart.

Federal and state law provide a similar range of protections against race discrimination. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a federal statute, prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race and color, as well as religion, national origin, and sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of numerous factors, including race, color, national origin, and ancestry. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 10:5-12(a).

New Jersey law and federal law differ in the extent to which they address age discrimination. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), a federal statute, only applies to individuals who are forty years old or older. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). It prohibits discrimination by employers based on age, using language similar to that found in Title VII. Id. at § 623(a). The statute allows exceptions, such as in cases of people who work in “a bona fide executive or a high policymaking position,” are at least sixty-five years old, and meet other criteria related to employment benefits. Id. at § 631(c).
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Employment discrimination on the basis of genetic information is an important area of law that has not received as much attention as other forms of discrimination. This is partly because the laws protecting against genetic information discrimination have not been on the books very long. At the federal level, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008 prohibits various types of discrimination in employment and health insurance. The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) prohibits discrimination by employers based on specific genetic traits. This area of law is likely to gain prominence as a wider range of genetic information becomes available. Multiple companies conduct genetic testing to provide genealogy information to consumers. They are then able to use those consumers’ genetic information in a variety of ways that are not well understood. Privacy laws and consumer contracts are likely to play as important a role as employment statutes in New Jersey and around the country. If you have questions of this nature, reach out to a New Jersey employment discrimination attorney.

GINA defines “genetic information” as information obtained from “genetic tests” of an individual or their family members, or from “the manifestation of a disease or disorder in family members of such individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A). It defines a “genetic test” as “an analysis of human DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites,” provided that it is able to “detect genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal changes.” Id. at § 2000ff(7). The statute prohibits discrimination by employers based on genetic information, using language that is similar to the prohibitions on employment discrimination found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at §§ 2000ff-1(a), 2000e-2(a).

Under the NJLAD, an employer commits an “unlawful employment practice” if they discriminate on the basis of an “atypical hereditary cellular or blood trait of any individual,” or an individual’s “refusal to submit to a genetic test or make available the results of a genetic test to an employer.” N.J. Rev. Stat. § 10:5-12(a). The statute specifically identifies the following traits: “sickle cell trait, hemoglobin C trait, thalassemia trait, Tay-Sachs trait, or cystic fibrosis trait.” Id. at §§ 10:5-5(x)-(cc). Its definition of “genetic test” is similar to the one found in GINA. Id. at § 10:5-5(pp).
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Under federal and New Jersey state law, age discrimination is an unlawful employment practice. If you have questions related to this area of law, contact a New Jersey employment discrimination attorney. The federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967 prohibits discrimination based on age involving employees who are at least forty years old. Workers cannot waive their rights under the ADEA unless employers to make specific written disclosures under the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA) of 1989. A lawsuit currently pending in New Jersey alleges that the defendant presented the plaintiff with a proposed severance agreement that violated the OWBPA. The defendant argued that the severance agreement was moot because the plaintiff never signed it. The court rejected this argument. It found that the severance agreement could serve as evidence of a broader pattern of age discrimination in violation of the ADEA. Fowler v. AT&T, Inc., et al, No. 3:18-cv-00667, mem. op. (D.N.J., Oct. 31, 2018).

The ADEA prohibits age discrimination against workers who are forty years of age or older. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631(a). The statute allows exceptions, such as “compulsory retirement” of an employee who is at least sixty-five years old, has worked for at least two years “in a bona fide executive or a high policymaking position,” and meets certain criteria related to retirement benefits. Id. at § 631(c).

The primary purpose of the OWBPA is to prevent discrimination against older workers with regard to fringe benefits like health insurance and retirement plans. For example, the statute requires employers to incur the same costs for benefits provide to workers age forty or older as are provided to younger workers, and prohibits refusal to hire an older worker solely in order to avoid the requirement to provide benefits. Id. at § 623(f)(2). It also states that employees cannot waive their rights under the ADEA unless the waiver is “knowing and voluntary,” based on specific disclosures. Id. at § 626(f).
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A federal jury recently found in favor of a former employee claiming national origin and age discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and state law. Middlebrooks v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al, No. 2:17-cv-00412, 2nd am. complaint (E.D. Pa., Apr. 25, 2017). The case is notable in part because the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, an Israeli pharmaceutical company and its American subsidiary, discriminated against him because of his “American origin.” Id. at 1. If you have questions of this nature, contact a New Jersey employment discrimination attorney.

In early 2018, the court allowed the plaintiff’s claims against the Israeli parent company to proceed under a theory of joint-employer liability. The case went to trial against both defendants in November 2018. The jury awarded the plaintiff over $6 million in damages.

Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of national origin, among other factors, and retaliation for reporting alleged unlawful acts. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-3(a). The ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age against individuals who are at least forty years old. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a). Unlawful discrimination may include harassment on the basis of a protected category, particularly when it creates a hostile work environment that prevents an individual from performing their job duties effectively.

Federal and state law prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sex, particularly with regard to salary and wages. New Jersey’s newly-enacted Diane B. Allen Equal Pay Act (DAEPA) is one of the most comprehensive laws in the country addressing wage disparities based on sex. The federal Equal Pay Act (EPA), while offering fewer protections, applies more broadly throughout the country. Both statutes allow employees to file suit and recover damages for wage discrimination. A lawsuit that is currently pending in a federal court alleges a widespread pattern of sex discrimination in wages and other features of employment. Cahill et al v. Nike, Inc., No. 3:18-cv-01477, complaint (D. Ore., Aug. 9, 2018). Although the case is filed in Oregon, where the defendant maintains in main headquarters, it could also affect workers in New Jersey and New York. The defendant has a significant presence in this part of the country, and recently opened a regional headquarters in New York City. If you have questions regarding possible instances of discrimination at your workplace, contact a New Jersey employment discrimination attorney to discuss.

The federal EPA was enacted as an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). It prohibits employers who are covered by the FLSA from paying workers of different genders at different rates “for equal work on jobs” that “require[] equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). Employers are not liable for wage disparities resulting from systems that are based on “seniority,” “merit,” “quantity or quality of production,” or “any other factor other than sex.” Id. Employees alleging wage discrimination based on sex are subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

New Jersey’s DAEPA, which took effect in July 2018, includes the same exceptions as the EPA for systems based on seniority, merit, etc., but it goes into more detail about these exceptions. Any differential in pay must be based on “legitimate, bona fide factors other than the characteristics of members of the protected class.” N.J. Rev. Stat. § 10:5-12(t)(1), as amended. Employees have six years to file suit for alleged violations.
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A new law, entitled the Diane B. Allen Equal Pay Act (DAEPA), went into effect in New Jersey on July 1, 2018. Described by the media as “the strongest equal pay law in America,” the law amends the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) to address disparities in pay based on all protected categories. If a covered business pays workers at different rates, it must justify the difference based on factors like education or experience. The state recently issued reporting forms for businesses that enter into certain contracts with the state, which they must submit to the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development.

The federal Equal Pay Act (EPA) of 1963 prohibits paying employees at different rates “on the basis of sex” in jobs that “require[] equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and…are performed under similar working conditions.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). The statute allows exceptions where the disparity is based on seniority, merit, “quantity or quality of production,” or other non-sex-based factors. Id. The EPA amended the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and allows complainants to recover damages through the same process for minimum wage and overtime violations. Id. at § 206(d)(3). The law has a two-year statute of limitations, meaning that complainants cannot recover damages for more than two years of New Jersey equal pay violations. Id. at §§ 216(c), 255(a).

The DAEPA was introduced in the New Jersey Legislature as Senate Bill 104 on January 9, 2018, and as Assembly Bill 1 on March 22. It passed both houses on March 26, and was signed into law by the governor on April 24, with an effective date of July 1. According to media analyses of federal labor statistics, female workers are paid eighty-two cents for every dollar paid to male workers in New Jersey. This number includes all women throughout the state. For women of color, the pay disparity is much greater. The DAEPA goes further than equal pay statutes that focus on sex or gender. It prohibits pay discrimination on the basis of any protected class identified by the NJLAD, such as race, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, etc.
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The U.S. Constitution limits the government’s ability to infringe on a range of rights, including the First Amendment right to free speech. In the context of New Jersey employment matters, this usually places far more limits on public employers than private employers. As a general rule, a private employer does not infringe on an employee’s freedom of speech if they discipline or fire that employee because of statements they have made. Since public employers are part of the government, they have less leeway with regard to employee speech. A lawsuit filed earlier this year, however, alleges that a private employer violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights by firing her because of her speech. Briskman v. Akima, LLC, No. 2018-5335, complaint (Va. Cir. Ct., Fairfax Cty., Apr. 4, 2018). The plaintiff claims that the defendant fired her “out of fear of unlawful retaliation by the government for constitutionally protected speech,” id. at 8, and that this makes her termination a violation of her First Amendment rights.

Caselaw has largely established broad protections for the free speech rights of public employees with regard to their employment. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, a public employee who speaks out about “issues of public importance” cannot be subject to termination by their employer, unless their statements were “knowingly or recklessly” false. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968). This does not apply, however, when the employee is speaking in their official capacity as a government employee. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).

Private employers have fewer restrictions with regard to disciplining employees, including terminating them, for statements they have made. This often applies even when the statement or statements at issue involved matters of public concern that were unrelated to the employee’s position with the employer. Some exceptions apply, such as when the speech involves activities protected by the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157, or when a state or local anti-discrimination law includes protections for “political activities,” N.Y. Lab. L. § 201-D. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that termination for an employee’s political activities, or their refusal to participate in political activities, could violate public policy. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F. 2d 894 (3rd Cir. 1983).

New Jersey is among the majority of the states in the U.S. in allowing, under the supervision of a doctor, the possession and use of marijuana for medical purposes. The New Jersey Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act (CUMA), N.J. Rev. Stat. § 24:6I-1 et seq., enacted in 2009, defines permissible uses for the drug, establishes prescription guidelines for doctors, and creates a registry for patients. Federal law, however, still classifies marijuana as a Schedule I controlled substance, meaning that as far as the federal government is concerned, marijuana has “no currently accepted medical use in treatment.” 21 U.S.C. §§ 812 (b)(1)(B), (c)(I)(c)(10). Possession of marijuana with a valid prescription could therefore still be illegal under federal law. In an employment context, medical marijuana use that is entirely legal in New Jersey could lead to problems. Neither federal nor New Jersey employment discrimination laws prohibit adverse employment actions based on lawful medical marijuana use, but a bill currently pending in the New Jersey Assembly intends to change that.

The New Jersey Legislature, in enacting CUMA, found that “[m]odern medical research has discovered a beneficial use for marijuana in treating…certain debilitating medical conditions,” regardless of what federal law says. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 24:6I-2(a). It also found that state law enforcement officials are not responsible for enforcing federal laws and that “[c]ompassion dictates that “medical marijuana patients should be “protect[ed] from arrest, prosecution, property forfeiture, and criminal and other penalties.” Id. at § 24:6I-2(e). The provisions of CUMA mainly deal with registration of patients and certification of doctors.

The statute currently places no obligations or restrictions on employers. Section 16 of CUMA specifically states that employers are not required “to accommodate the medical use of marijuana in any workplace.” Id. at § 24:6I-14. The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) does not include medical marijuana use as a protected category. See N.J. Rev. Stat. § 10:5-12(a). While it does include disability as a category, this is not likely to offer much protection for medical marijuana users. Not all conditions for which medical marijuana may be prescribed would qualify as disabilities under the NJLAD. Even if the underlying condition did qualify as a disability, it is conceivable that an employer could justify taking an adverse action because the employee’s conduct violates federal law, instead of because of the disability. This is where the proposed bill comes in.

Professional football presents multiple legal issues related to employment. New Jersey officially has no team in the National Football League. That said, both of the New York-based NFL teams, the Giants and the Jets, have used stadiums in Northern New Jersey as their home fields since the early 1980s. Issues affecting players in the NFL, particularly the lasting effects of concussions and other injuries, have received media attention in recent years. NFL cheerleaders have also made a variety of complaints regarding wages, working conditions, and sexual harassment. In 2016, the New York Jets settled a New Jersey wage and hour lawsuit filed on behalf of a class of NFL cheerleaders. In 2018, a former cheerleader, who had recently been fired by another team, filed a sex discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).

While NFL players usually receive generous salaries under contracts with their teams, cheerleaders are often paid far less and do not have the protection of a defined term of employment. NFL cheerleaders have recently made several successful wage claims. A lawsuit filed in New Jersey in 2014, Krystal C. v. New York Jets LLC, alleged that the compensation received by members of the Jets’ cheerleading squad, when compared to the number of hours they were required to work, was often substantially less than minimum wage. Cheerleaders were paid $150 per game and $100 for appearances at team-sponsored events, but not for other required activities like practices and rehearsals. The parties entered into a settlement agreement in 2016, in which the team agreed to pay $325,000 to the class of plaintiffs.

Claims of sex discrimination involving NFL cheerleaders have not received as much attention in the court system as wage claims. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. Cheerleading, as an occupation, presents some challenges in this area. Technical skill, including proficiency in dance, is not the only requirement for the job of cheerleader. To put it bluntly, cheerleaders are expected to meet a particular standard of physical attractiveness.

New Jersey gender discrimination statutes protect workers from discrimination on the basis of sex or gender. An important feature of many types of sex discrimination is “sex stereotyping,” meaning the use of stereotypes commonly associated with one gender to assess an employee’s performance or a job applicant’s suitability for a job. Many cases deal with sex stereotyping as a way of penalizing an employee who fails to embody outward stereotypes, such as a female employee who an employer thinks appears too masculine, or a male employee who appears feminine. A recent study addresses another aspect of sex stereotyping that could lead to workplace discrimination:  the association of traits like confidence and intelligence with men, leading to more negative impressions of women possessing those same traits.

The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized sex stereotyping as a form of sex discrimination in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). The plaintiff in that case alleged that the defendant passed her over for partnership because she did not conform to various feminine stereotypes. While partners at the firm praised the plaintiff’s ability to do her job, they also stated that her “aggressiveness apparently spilled over into abrasiveness.” Id. at 234. These traits, however, were not necessarily viewed as negatives in male employees. The court held that employers may not “evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group.” Id. at 251.

The Third Circuit addressed sex stereotyping of male employees in a case involving a self-described “effeminate man” who did not “fit in” with his “rough around the edges” male coworkers. Prowel v. Wise Business Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 287 (3rd Cir. 2009). He alleged a lengthy pattern of workplace harassment, including the use of nicknames like “Princess,” “Rosebud,” and others best not repeated. The defendant sought to dismiss the case on the ground that the plaintiff, who is gay, was actually making “an artfully pleaded claim of sexual orientation discrimination,” which the Third Circuit has found not to be covered under federal law. Id. at 291. See also Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3rd Cir. 2001). The court found, however, that the plaintiff’s claim centered on discrimination “because he did not conform to [the defendant’s] vision of how a man should look, speak, and act,” rather than his sexual orientation itself. Prowel at 292.

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