Articles Posted in Discrimination

Employment discrimination is not limited to individual acts of overtly disparate treatment based on factors like race, sex, national origin, or disability. It can also take much more subtle forms, which might only be visible if one takes a much broader look at an employer’s practices. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) calls this “systemic discrimination.” While it can affect large numbers of workers in one or more protected classes, it can also be difficult to prove in a legal proceeding. The EEOC recently published a review touting “significant success” in a nationwide program that it launched in 2006 to fight systemic discrimination. New Jersey courts have addressed systemic discrimination under federal and state employment laws, providing workers with a variety of means for asserting their rights.

The EEOC defines systemic discrimination as any “pattern or practice, policy, or class case” having “a broad impact on an industry, profession, company, or geographic area.” Examples of unlawful systemic discrimination might include questions on job applications that unlawfully exclude people with disabilities, as well as restrictions on access to “management trainee programs” or “high level jobs” that disparately affect prospective trainees or employees based on factors like race or gender.

According to the EEOC’s 10-year review, published in July 2016, the agency has prevailed in 94 percent of the lawsuits brought through its nationwide systemic discrimination program. The amount of monetary damages recovered during the period covering fiscal years 2011 through 2015 was reportedly three times as much as the amount recovered during the previous five fiscal years. Between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2015, the EEOC also increased the rate of “successful voluntary conciliations of systemic investigations” from 21 percent to 64 percent.

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People who are not United States citizens or lawful permanent residents, and who lack official authorization to be in the U.S., are often referred to as undocumented immigrants—as well as a variety of less polite terms. Although undocumented immigrants are not officially allowed to live or work in the U.S., they may still be able to avail themselves of the protections of certain federal, state, and local laws. New Jersey courts have held that undocumented immigrants have standing to sue an employer under some laws, but not others. A recent federal appellate court ruling could affect these precedents. A court ruled that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has the authority to subpoena employment records in connection with an undocumented immigrant’s discrimination complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. EEOC v. Maritime Autowash, Inc., No. 15-1947, slip op. (4th Cir., Apr. 25, 2016).

The Constitution gives the federal government exclusive authority over immigration law and policy, including official determinations of an immigrant’s status and work authorization for immigrants. Employers are prohibited from recruiting, hiring, or employing anyone who lacks work authorization. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a. They must verify every employee’s work eligibility by collecting documentary proof that they are a U.S. citizen, a lawful permanent resident, or an authorized visa holder.

Federal immigration law includes employment discrimination provisions, but they specifically exclude people who lack work authorization. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3). In determining whether a particular employment statute applies to undocumented immigrants, courts often look at whether the statute expressly limits its coverage to individuals with work authorization, or otherwise excludes undocumented immigrants.

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Age discrimination in the technology industry has received considerable media coverage in recent years, as several high-profile technology executives have made quite blatant statements of bias against older workers. Employment discrimination takes many forms, however, and frequently involves subtle actions, or patterns of action, rather than anything overtly and unmistakably discriminatory. The use of certain terms or phrases in job postings may serve as evidence of bias against certain protected groups. Claims against tech companies have alleged age discrimination based on employment advertisements stating preferences like “new grads.” Over the past year, the term “digital native” has emerged as the latest in a long line of possible indicators of age bias by technology companies and other employers around the country.

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., prohibits discrimination on the basis of age against workers who are at least 40 years old. Exceptions include a “bona fide occupational qualification” involving age, or “reasonable factors other than age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1), 29 C.F.R. §§ 1625.6, 1625.7. The statute does not prevent an employer from favoring someone age 40 or older over someone younger than 40, based solely on age. It is only intended to protect older workers from discriminatory practices favoring younger workers. The number of age discrimination complaints received annually by the Equal Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has increased from 15,785 in 1997 to 20,144 in 2015

Statements indicating bias against older workers seem to be common in the tech industry, if the news media are any indication. In 2007, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, who was 22 years old at the time, stood on stage at a conference and declared that “young people are just smarter.” His company settled an age discrimination claim with state regulators six years later, after the company advertised a job opening with the caveat that it preferred applicants from the “Class of 2007 or 2008.” It is not entirely clear why so many in the tech industry seem to favor younger workers. Youth is by no means an indicator of superior aptitude with computer technology, but that is apparently the perception of many. This is where the term “digital native” comes into play.

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The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency charged with investigating and prosecuting employment discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, recently settled a lawsuit against a company that operates a chain of retail stores in the New York metropolitan area. The lawsuit, filed as a class action, alleged a pattern or practice of sex discrimination in which the company refused to hire women for various positions. EEOC v. Mavis Discount Tire, Inc., et al., No. 1:12-cv-00741, complaint (S.D.N.Y., Jan. 31, 2012). The parties reached a settlement agreement in early 2016, in which the defendant agreed to pay $2.1 million and take various remedial actions.

Laws at the federal and state levels in New Jersey, New York, and elsewhere prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of sex or gender. This includes overt acts of discrimination against an individual employee or job applicant, and it may also include less obvious forms of discrimination. Systemic discrimination, commonly known as “pattern or practice” discrimination, occurs when an employer enacts policies or engages in practices that have a disparate impact on certain people based on a protected category, such as sex, race, or religion.

An employer may undertake a pattern or practice with the intent of discriminating against a protected group, but intent to discriminate is not a required element for a claim under Title VII. Even if a pattern or practice is “neutral on its face,” it is unlawful if it “operate[s] to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.” Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). A plaintiff in a Title VII claim must establish that a pattern or practice has a disparate impact, and then the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate its “business necessity,” which must be specifically “related to job performance.” Id. at 431. Congress codified the prohibition on systemic discrimination with the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).

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Five members of the U.S. women’s national soccer team (USWNT) have filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging unlawful wage discrimination by the U.S. Soccer Federation (USSF). They allege that they are paid substantially less than members of the U.S. men’s national soccer team (USMNT), despite generating significantly more revenue in recent years than the men’s team. They are asserting their claim on behalf of all members of the USWNT. The EEOC will investigate the claim, and it may decide to pursue the claim on the players’ behalf. Otherwise, it will issue a “right to sue” letter, allowing the players to file a private cause of action.

Under the Equal Pay Act (EPA), employers are generally prohibited from paying employees of one gender less than employees of another gender for the same work. The statute allows exceptions to this rule if the difference in wages is based on a system of seniority, merit, or “quantity or quality of production,” or on the vaguely worded “any other factor other than sex.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). The USWNT players’ complaint essentially argues that they have produced a superior “quality of production” yet are paid significantly less than their male colleagues.

The USWNT, which was formed in 1985, is one of the world’s most successful soccer teams. It has won three World Cup titles, most recently in Canada in 2015, and four Olympic gold medals, most recently in London in 2012. The final game of the 2015 World Cup, in which the USWNT beat the Japanese team 5-2, drew more than 53,000 spectators and around 23 million television viewers.

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Two new employment laws took effect in New York City in late 2015 that limit the uses employers may make of job applicants’ credit and criminal histories. Individuals who, for whatever reason, have credit problems, or who have a record of one or more arrests, criminal charges, or convictions, may have difficulty finding a job because of this information, whether it is directly relevant to the job or not. The “Stop Credit Discrimination in Employment Act” (SCDEA) prohibits employers from requesting or using the consumer credit history of a job applicant or employee, except in specific, narrow circumstances. The “Fair Chance Act” (FCA) restricts when employers may ask about criminal history, and how they may use that information. New Jersey state law addresses criminal history in employment on a more limited basis, but it does not protect credit information.

The SCDEA, which took effect in September 2015, amends the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) to add a provision regarding employers’ use of consumer credit history. It defines “consumer credit history” as a person’s “credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, or payment history,” based on certain types of information. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(29). Credit information typically comes from credit reports and credit scores issued by the major consumer credit bureaus, but the NYCHRL states that it can also come directly from the job applicant or employee if it relates to “details about credit accounts,…bankruptcies, judgments or liens.” Id.

An employer, under the SCDEA, may not request or use consumer credit information in hiring decisions, nor may it discriminate based on an employee’s credit history. N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(24). The law allows exceptions if state or federal law requires a review of credit history. Other exceptions include jobs as a police officer or certain other law enforcement positions, any job that requires the employer to obtain a bond, jobs requiring security clearance under state or federal law, and jobs that involve high levels of financial responsibility or digital security. A bill with similar provisions, S. 1130, passed the New Jersey Senate in June 2015, but its companion bill in the Assembly died in committee.

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A criminal record of any kind can be a serious impediment to finding a job. Many employers have policies excluding anyone with a felony conviction record, or even a misdemeanor record, from employment, regardless of whether it has any bearing on the job in question. “Ban the Box” (BTB) laws are intended to help people who might be qualified for a job but are unable to find work because of a criminal record. New Jersey passed the Opportunity to Compete Act (OCA), P.L. 2014 ch. 32, in June 2014. It took effect on March 1, 2015. The New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development (LWD) issued new regulations implementing the law in December. 47 N.J.R. 3034(a) (Dec. 7, 2015).Numerous cities and states around the country have enacted BTB laws. The “box” in question refers to the checkbox on many job applications asking whether the applicant has a criminal record indicating one or more arrests, charges, or convictions. At a minimum, BTB laws prohibit employers from asking about criminal history during the initial stage of the job application process. Some laws go much further, such as New York City’s broad prohibition on employment discrimination based on criminal history. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(9) – (11-b).

In New Jersey, the OCA does not extend as far as New York City’s law, but it still provides several important protections. During the “initial employment application process,” employers may not inquire about an applicant’s’ criminal history, either verbally or in writing, nor may they require an applicant to provide such information in any other form. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 34:6B-14. Advertisements for job openings cannot state that an employer will not consider applicants with criminal histories. Id. at § 34:6B-15.

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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not the only federal statute that protects employees from discrimination in the workplace. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which was first enacted in 1952, prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of “national origin” and “citizenship status.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324b. Those two terms have specific meanings in this context. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) enforces these provisions through its Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices (OSC), and the Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO) adjudicates claims. In late 2015, the OSC issued an opinion letter addressing questions about the extent of the INA’s anti-discrimination protections.

The INA prohibits discrimination in hiring, recruitment, and firing of individuals based on their national origin. It also prohibits discrimination in these areas on the basis of citizenship status, but only for “protected individuals,” whom it defines to include U.S. citizens, individuals who have recently attained lawful permanent resident status (i.e., a “green card”), and people who have been granted official status as refugees or asylees. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(3). These provisions are much narrower in scope than those of Title VII.

The INA states that its prohibition against national origin discrimination does not apply if the alleged discriminatory act violates Title VII’s provisions on national origin, meaning there is not intended to be any overlap between the INA and Title VII. Id. at § 1324b(a)(2)(B). The prohibition on discrimination based on citizenship only applies to “protected individuals,” as defined above, and it does not apply if an employer prefers to employ a U.S. citizen or national over an equally qualified non-citizen. Id. at 1324b(a)(4).

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Federal law and New Jersey state law generally prohibit wage discrimination, in which an employer pays different wages to employees of different genders who hold substantially similar positions or have substantially similar job duties. As the issue of wage disparity between male and female employees gains attention nationwide, understanding these laws is critically important. It can be difficult to establish that one employee has the same job as a higher-paid employee. Some employers, however, prevent workers from ever reaching that point by prohibiting their employees from disclosing or inquiring about wage information with co-workers. This practice, commonly known as “pay secrecy,” remains common despite laws prohibiting it at the federal and state levels.

The federal Equal Pay Act amended the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to ban payment of different wages to male and female employees for jobs requiring “equal skill, effort, and responsibility…performed under similar working conditions.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). The law allows exceptions for seniority, merit, and quantitative or qualitative factors, and the broadly-construed “differential based on any other factor other than sex.” Id. A bill that would have limited this last category, the Paycheck Fairness Act, died in the Senate in 2014. New Jersey law merely states that employers may not discriminate in the payment of wages based on sex, and it allows exceptions for any “reasonable factor or factors other than sex.” N.J. Rev. Stat. 34:11-56.2.

In order to assert their rights under federal or state wage discrimination laws, employees must know that a difference in wages exists. Many employers keep that from happening by enacting pay secrecy policies. Among private-sector employees, estimates of how many are subject to such policies range from one-third to more than 60 percent. Penalties for discussing pay rates or inquiring about pay rates can include anything from reprimands to termination.

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The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of “disability,” as defined by the statute, and requires them to provide “reasonable accommodations” to disabled employees and job applicants. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102, 12112(b)(5)(A). The ADA’s definition of “disability” includes a wide range of conditions that “substantially limit[] one or more major life activities.” Id. at § 12102(1)(A). Courts have found that infection with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) may constitute a disability under the ADA. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recently published two guidance documents addressing the rights of HIV-positive employees and job applicants.

The U.S. Supreme Court first ruled that an HIV infection may constitute a disability under the ADA in 1998, although it did so without a clear majority of justices. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 655 (1998); see also Fiscus v. Wal-Mart Stores, 385 F.3d 378, 383 (3rd Cir. 2004). In order to qualify for ADA protection, an individual must demonstrate a limitation on their “life activities” caused by their condition. The regulations implementing the ADA state that, by “substantially limit[ing] immune function,” an HIV infection can qualify as a substantial limitation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii).

The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) also protects employees and job applicants from disability discrimination, including discrimination based on an HIV infection. The definition of “disability” under the NJLAD expressly includes “AIDS or HIV infection.” N.J. Rev. Stat. 10:5-5(q). Unlike the ADA, the NJLAD’s definition of “disability” does not require evidence of substantial impairment of life activities. The NJLAD also requires employers to make reasonable accommodations for employees with disabilities, unless doing so would create an “undue hardship.” N.J.A.C. § 13:13-2.5(b).

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