Articles Posted in Discrimination

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The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff et seq., protects employees from privacy violations and discrimination in employment based on information obtained through DNA tests and other procedures. It also prohibits employers from requiring employees to submit DNA samples, with narrowly defined exceptions. Some states have similar laws, such as New Jersey’s Genetic Privacy Act of 1996, N.J.S.A. § 10:5-43 et seq., which amended the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination to prohibit employment discrimination based on “genetic information,” N.J.S.A. § 10:5-12(a). Few court decisions have considered the scope of these laws’ protections, however. A recent court decision and jury verdict, however, in Lowe, et al v. Atlas Logistics Group Retail Svcs. (Atlanta), LLC, No. 1:13-v-02425, complaint (N.D. Ga., Jul. 22, 2013), suggests that these laws could provide an very effective defense against discrimination and employer intrusions into employee privacy.

Congress enacted GINA in 2008, so the statute has not amassed much of a track record in the court system. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has brought suit under GINA in several cases around the country for a wide range of practices:

– In EEOC v. Fabricut, Inc., the EEOC alleged that an employer violated GINA by allegedly refusing to hire a job applicant it thought had carpal tunnel syndrome, and by asking for her medical history. The employer settled the suit for $50,000.
– A class discrimination suit against a New York nursing home, EEOC v. Founders Pavilion, Inc., claimed that the employer unlawfully requested genetic information from job applicants. The defendant settled for $370,000. A lawsuit against another New York nursing home with similar allegations, EEOC v. BNV Home Care Agency, is still pending.
– A lawsuit against several seed and fertilizer companies for alleged medical and genetic information inquiries during the hiring process, EEOC v. All Star Seed, Inc., et al., resulted in a $187,500 settlement.
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Legal protections for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals remain uncertain in many parts of the country, despite recent court victories. Fewer than half of U.S. states prohibit employment discrimination based on sexual orientation (the “LGB” part of the acronym) or gender identity (the “T” part). The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) expressly prohibits both types of discrimination, but Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 only protects people from discrimination based on sex, race, color, religion, and national origin. A recent decision by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), however, held that Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination already covers sexual orientation discrimination. Baldwin v. Dept. of Transportation, EEOC Appeal No. 0120133080 (Jul. 15, 2015) (PDF file). A 2012 decision, Macy v. Dept. of Transportation, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (Apr. 20, 2012), held that this part of Title VII covers gender identity. These decisions only apply to federal employees, but they are still an important step forward. Most employment discrimination claims still require a careful analysis of federal, state, and city laws.

The complainant in the recent EEOC decision claimed that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) discriminated against him on the basis of his status as a gay man when it denied him a particular promotion, citing negative remarks allegedly made by his supervisor. The FAA dismissed his complaint as untimely, and he appealed to the EEOC. After finding that the complaint was timely, the EEOC ruled that the important question in a sexual orientation discrimination claim is not “whether sexual orientation is explicitly listed in Title VII as a prohibited basis for employment actions,” but “whether the agency has ‘relied on sex-based considerations’ or ‘take[n] gender into account’ when taking the challenged employment action.” Baldwin at 5-6, quoting Macy at 6. See also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).

The EEOC’s decisions in both Baldwin and Macy, interestingly, relied rather heavily on a Supreme Court decision written by Justice Scalia, who is not known for his support of expanded legal protections for LGBT individuals. The Supreme Court ruled in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), that a male oil-rig worker could sue for sexual harassment by male co-workers. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Scalia stated that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil [they were passed to combat] to cover reasonably comparable evils.” Baldwin at 13, quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79.
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The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of a woman who claimed that a clothing retailer violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when it turned down her job application. She specifically alleged that the retailer discriminated against her because she wore a headscarf as part of her religious practice as a Muslim, which the retailer claimed violated a policy on employee attire. The retailer claimed that she never requested a religious accommodation–such as an exception to the policy prohibiting headwear–and argued that it was not liable for any violation of her rights because it had no “actual knowledge” that she needed an accommodation. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the complainant only needed to prove that her need for a religious accommodation motivated the decision not to hire her. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n (EEOC) v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. ___ (2015).

The complainant was a teenager when she applied for a job at an Abercrombie & Fitch store in 2008. She wore a headscarf to her interview with an assistant manager at the store. The assistant manager determined that the complainant was qualified for the position. She was reportedly concerned, however, that the complainant’s headscarf violated the store’s “Look Policy,” which regulated how employees dress at work in an effort to maintain a consistent style across the retailer’s nationwide locations. The assistant manager took her concerns to the store manager, who stated that the headscarf violated the Look Policy and instructed the assistant manager not to hire the complainant.

The EEOC filed suit against the retailer in 2009 on the complainant’s behalf, alleging that the decision not to hire her was motivated by her religion, as signified by her headscarf, in violation of Title VII. A district court granted summary judgment for the EEOC on the question of liability. 798 F.Supp.2d 1272 (N.D. Ok. 2011). It awarded the complainant $20,000 in damages after a trial. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed these rulings and entered summary judgment for the defendant. It held that the defendant lacked “actual knowledge” of the complainant’s need for a religious accommodation because she failed to request it, and the defendant therefore could not be liable for religious discrimination under Title VII. 731 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2013).
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Employment discrimination on the basis of age, especially against workers who are into or past what is often considered “middle age,” and who are looking for a job, does not always receive as much media attention as other forms of discrimination. The federal and state laws regarding this type of discrimination are also not as well known or understood. It is becoming more and more of a problem, however, as the American population ages. A few recent cases illustrate how an age discrimination claim in New Jersey might work.

Research regarding the issues faced by older workers indicates that people in their 50s or older tend to have a much harder time finding a job than younger workers. The discrimination is rarely overt, instead taking the form of certain reasons given not to hire someone, such as “You’re overqualified.” This can make discrimination difficult to prove, but the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD) allows claims for age discrimination in employment. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 10:5-12(a). The federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., also allows civil claims, but it only applies to workers above a certain age in certain situations.

The NJLAD provides relatively strong protection for workers asserting age discrimination claims. New Jersey courts have held that the statute preempts common law claims, such as breach of contract or breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, if they are primarily based on alleged age discrimination. See Broad v. Home Depot USA, 16 F.Supp.3d 413, 419 (D.N.J. 2014). The ADEA protects workers who are 40 years of age or older against discrimination that is not based on a “reasonable factor other than age.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7, 77 Fed. Reg. 19080 (Mar. 30, 2012). It also prohibits workplace harassment based on age. The statute does not, however, prohibit an employer from favoring an older employee over a younger one.
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The New York City Council passed legislation in April 2015 amending the city’s anti-discrimination law to prohibit employment discrimination based on information found in an employee’s or job applicant’s consumer credit history. This is part of a broader trend of laws at the city and state levels around the country that limit the use of background checks when making employment decisions. Similar laws have been introduced in the New Jersey Legislature, but they have not passed either chamber. New Jersey law offers some protection for consumers with regard to their credit information, including restrictions on when and how employers may access credit reports.

The federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the New Jersey Fair Credit Reporting Act (NJFRCA), and other statutes regulate the collection, distribution, and use of information by credit reporting agencies. These statutes define “consumer reports” in part as financial and personal information about a consumer, communicated in writing or verbally, that is intended for use “in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for…employment purposes.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1)(B), N.J. Rev. Stat. § 56:11-30(1)(b), N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 380-A(c)(1)(ii). Under New Jersey law, an employer may not obtain a person’s credit report unless they provide notice in a particular form to the person and obtain the person’s consent. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 56:11-31c.

The New Jersey statute does not prohibit an employer from taking adverse action against an employee or job applicant based, in whole or in part, on information contained in a consumer report. If the employer does take adverse action against a person, however, it must first provide the person with a copy of their consumer report and a notice of their rights under the NJFCRA and the FCRA. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 56:11-31e.
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Laws regarding medical–or even recreational–marijuana use are undergoing significant changes. Nearly half of the states in the U.S., including New Jersey, now allow marijuana use for at least some purposes. How this affects employees’ rights in New Jersey, however, remains unclear. The issue, which is far from resolved, pits individuals’ right to use marijuana against employers’ right to enforce anti-drug policies. A lawsuit filed last year in New Jersey, Davis v. New Jersey Transit Corp., No. L-001778-14, complaint (N.J. Super. Ct., Essex Co., Mar. 14, 2014), claims disability discrimination against a railroad employee with a valid medical marijuana prescription.

Marijuana remains a Schedule I controlled substance under federal law, 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1), and it is still generally illegal under New Jersey law, N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 2C:35-10a(3)-(4). The New Jersey Compassionate Use Medical Marijuana Act, N.J. Rev. Stat. § 6I-1 et seq., which took effect in 2010, allows the medical use of marijuana under very strict limits. Rather than “legalizing” marijuana, the law creates an exception to state criminal law. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2C:35-18. It provides that the lawful use of marijuana may not result in “civil or administrative penalt[ies],” N.J. Rev. Stat. § 24:6I-6b, but it does not specifically mention employment or disability protections.

The plaintiff in Davis worked as a procurement clerk for NJ Transit. His doctor gave him a prescription for medical marijuana to alleviate some of the symptoms of end-stage renal failure. He states that he notified his employer of the prescription, but was told that he had to submit to a drug test in December 2013. When the test was positive for marijuana, he was sent to a drug treatment program and lost his job. He filed suit for disability discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. N.J. Rev. Stat. § 10:5-12a. In August 2014, the court denied a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant. The case is still pending.
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A former program manager for the internet company Facebook has filed a lawsuit against the company in state court in California, alleging sexual harassment and discrimination based on race and gender. Hong v. Facebook, Inc., et al, No. CIV-532943, complaint (Cal. Super. Ct., San Mateo Co., Mar. 16, 2015). The case alleges numerous acts of conduct towards the plaintiff that, when taken in isolation, might seem minor, but that add up over time to constitute significant disparate treatment based on her gender and her national origin. The laws at the state and federal level are clear that employers may not discriminate in promotions, job duties, and other features of employment based on these categories. These types of claims, unfortunately, can be difficult to prove. Another recent lawsuit against a Silicon Valley venture capital firm made similar allegations but resulted in a jury verdict for the defendant. The current case makes a wide range of allegations, however, that indicate overtly discriminatory treatment towards the plaintiff.

According to her complaint, the defendant hired the plaintiff in June 2010 for the position of program manager. It transferred her to “technology partner” in October 2012. She claims that she performed her job duties well throughout her time with the company, pointing to “satisfactory performance evaluations” and regular raises as evidence. Hong, complaint at 2. Prior to the events immediately preceding her termination, she states that she “received no significant criticism of her work.” Id. She was allegedly terminated on October 17, 2013.

The plaintiff alleges that multiple employees of the defendant, including her supervisor, who is named individually as a defendant, and others identified in the complaint as “Does One through Thirty,” discriminated against her based on gender. This allegedly included comments belittling her work and admonishment for “exercis[ing] her right under company policy to take time off to visit her child at school.” Id. at 3. She also claims that she was given assignments that no male co-workers were expected to do, such as organizing office parties and serving drinks. She makes a direct allegation that the company hired a “less qualified, less experienced male” to replace her. Id.
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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, or “Obamacare” to some) creates a variety of incentives to encourage employers to create and sponsor “wellness programs” for their employees. Several federal agencies, including the Department of Labor (DOL), have issued rules implementing these incentives within the requirements of federal statutes like the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which enforces employment nondiscrimination statutes, was not involved in those rulemaking processes. It issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in March 2015, stating that it will review how the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., affects the wellness program provisions of the ACA. It issued a proposed rule in April.

The Public Health Service Act (PHSA), as amended by HIPAA and the ACA, defines a “wellness program” as “a program offered by an employer that is designed to promote health or prevent disease.” 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(1)(A). HIPAA prohibits discrimination in group health plans, in terms of eligibility, benefits, and other factors, based on a participant’s health. It makes one exception, however, by allowing discounts, rebates, or other benefits for participants who follow an employer-sponsored wellness program.

The DOL, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) jointly issued a final rule implementing the HIPAA nondiscrimination provisions for wellness programs. 71 Fed. Reg. 75014 (Dec. 13, 2006). The rule established two types of wellness programs: participatory programs, which should be made available to all similarly-situated employees regardless of their health status; and health-contingent programs, which may be tailored to employees’ particular health needs, such as a program to help employees quit smoking.

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Many well-known businesses, particularly restaurant chains, use the franchise model to operate national, or even international, chains of locations. Under this model, the franchise owner enters into agreements with other businesses to operate locations using the franchise’s brand name. These businesses, known as franchisees, must abide by a wide range of requirements under the franchise agreement. Employees of individual franchise locations are considered employees of the franchisee, but multiple complaints and lawsuits in recent years have sought to hold a franchisor liable for acts of a franchisee, based on the theory that the franchise agreement gives the franchisor substantial control over the franchisee’s business. A recent lawsuit against the McDonald’s franchisor asserts that it is liable for race discrimination by a franchisee. Betts, et al v. McDonald’s Corp., et al., No. 4:15-cv-00002, complaint (W.D. Va., Jan. 22, 2015).

The plaintiffs are African-American former employees of a company that operates three McDonald’s restaurants in Clarkesville and South Boston, Virginia. They describe a lengthy sequence of events involving alleged racial and sexual harassment and discrimination by managers employed by the franchisee, culminating in an allegedly overt decision to “reduce the number of African-American employees.” Betts, complaint at 28. All but one of the plaintiffs state that they were terminated on May 12, 2014. The other plaintiff alleges that the company constructively discharged her on July 5, 2014, after “months of racial abuse.” Id. at 32.

The plaintiffs filed suit against the franchisee, several individual managers, and the franchisors. They are asserting seven causes of action, including claims for wrongful termination, constructive discharge, and racial harassment under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and sexual harassment under Title VII.
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A delivery driver for United Parcel Service (UPS) filed suit against her employer after it allegedly refused to assign her to light duty due to pregnancy-related lifting restrictions. She claimed that the company violated her rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) of 1978, which defines discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as a form of unlawful sex discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a U.S. district judge’s order dismissing the lawsuit. Young v. United Parcel Service (“Young I“), 707 F.3d 437 (4th Cir. 2013). The Supreme Court vacated this ruling and remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the plaintiff was entitled to trial on the question of whether she suffered unlawful discrimination. Young v. United Parcel Service (“Young II“), 575 U.S. ___ (2015). While the case was pending, UPS announced a reversal of its policy on light duty for pregnant employees.

The plaintiff worked as a part-time delivery driver. The job description required the ability to lift packages weighing up to 70 pounds. When the plaintiff became pregnant, her doctor told her that she should not lift more than 20 pounds during the first 20 weeks, and no more than 10 pounds after that. The defendant refused to put her on light duty, despite, according to the plaintiff, accommodating other employees with similar lifting restrictions. The plaintiff went on unpaid leave, which resulted in the loss of her employee health insurance.

The defendant’s policy was to provide light duty for employees who were injured on the job, were entitled to an accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, or had lost their certification from the Department of Transportation. Pregnancy did not fit into any of these categories, according to the defendant. The Fourth Circuit held that this policy did not violate the PDA because the plaintiff’s pregnancy was unrelated to her job, the policy only applied to job-related conditions, and it treated “pregnant workers and nonpregnant workers alike.” Young I, 707 F.3d at 449.
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