Articles Posted in NLRB Decisions

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects workers’ rights to engage in activities related to labor organizing. The statute established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to investigate and adjudicate alleged violations. Union organizing can now take place both online and in real life, and the NLRB regularly considers questions involving communications technologies like email. Its rulings can affect not just New Jersey employment law but workers in New Jersey and all over the country. In 2007, the NLRB ruled that employers can place restrictions on employees’ use of company email for non-work purposes, even if it might restrict employees’ ability to engage in NLRA-protected activities. It overturned that decision in 2014, but now the NLRB is asking the public to file briefs addressing whether it should return to the standard it established in 2007.

Section 7 identifies workers’ “right to self-organization,” and to engage in activities related to “bargain[ing] collectively through representatives of their own choosing.” 29 U.S.C. § 157. An employer commits an “unfair labor practice” under § 8 of the NLRA if it “interfere[s] with, restrain[s], or coerce[s]” an employee attempting to exercise a protected right. Id. at § 158(a)(1). Congress enacted the NLRA in 1935, and it last amended § 7 in 1947. The nature of union organizing has changed in many ways since that time, and the job of interpreting § 7 in light of new technologies has largely fallen on the NLRB.

In 2007, the NLRB ruled that “employees have no statutory right to use the [employer’s] e-mail system for Section 7 purposes.” The Guard Publishing Co. d/b/a The Register-Guard, et al, 351 NLRB 1110 (2007). The employer in that case, a newspaper, installed a computer system in 1996 that provided email accounts for many of the employees. It maintained a policy prohibiting employees from using their email accounts for “non-job-related solicitations.” Id. at 1111. An employee alleged violations of § 7 after the employer issued several written warnings to her about using her company email account to send notices about union activities. The NLRB affirmed an administrative law judge’s (ALJ’s) 2002 ruling that the employer’s policy did not violate § 8, but that the employer violated § 8 by enforcing the policy in a discriminatory manner.
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New Jersey labor laws protect the rights of workers to organize for the purpose of collectively asserting their workplace rights, such as by forming a union to engage in collective bargaining with their employer’s management. At the federal level, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects a wide range of activities related to organizing, and prohibits employers from interfering with employees in the exercise of those rights. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is charged with investigating and, in some cases, issuing rulings on alleged violations of the NLRA. An ongoing issue of dispute between employers and employees is the extent to which employers can bar their employees from engaging in organizing activities on the employer’s property. The NLRB recently ruled that an employer’s ban on solicitation on company property was an unfair labor practice under the NLRA. UPMC, 366 NLRB No. 142 (2018).

Section 7 of the NLRA protects workers’ “right to self-organization,” which includes the right “to form, join, or assist labor organizations.” 29 U.S.C. § 157. It is an “unfair labor practice” for employers “to interfere with [or] restrain…employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in” Section 7. Id. at § 158(a)(1). Employees may file complaints alleging unfair labor practices with the NLRB.

The NLRB’s website states the agency’s position regarding employees’ solicitation of their fellow employees for union membership: “Working time is for work.” Employers, according to the NLRB, are permitted to “maintain and enforce non-discriminatory rules limiting solicitation and distribution,” but they cannot prohibit such activity “during non-work time, such as before or after work or during break times.” It bases this position on U.S. Supreme Court decisions affirming the right to engage in solicitation outside of work hours. The UPMC case involves businesses providing healthcare services. The Supreme Court has ruled that “health care facilities [must] permit employee solicitation and distribution during nonworking time in nonworking areas,” provided that the employer has not shown that such activities cause “disruption of health care operations or disturbance of patients.” Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 507 (1978).

Establishing an employer-employee relationship is the first step in claims under most federal and New Jersey employment statutes, but that relationship is not always easy to identify. Multiple individuals or organizations can act in the capacity of an employer over a particular worker. They can cause the same harm that employment statutes were created to address, so courts have recognized the concept of “joint employment” for this type of situation. In 2015, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) expanded the earlier standard for determining joint employment in cases brought under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc., 362 NLRB No. 186 (Aug. 27, 2015). Two years later, the NLRB reversed this ruling in Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, Ltd. (“Hy-Brand I”), 365 NLRB No. 156 (Dec. 14, 2017), but this victory for employers was short-lived. The NLRB vacated its ruling after finding that one of the board members who voted in Hy-Brand I should have recused himself. Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors, Ltd. (“Hy-Brand II”), 366 NLRB No. 26 (Feb. 26, 2018).

In Browning-Ferris, the NLRB revised its standard for determining joint employment. The standard in place at the time looked at the extent of control actually exercised over an employee by an alleged joint employer. The NLRB found that this standard was too narrow. It held that an alleged joint employer does not need to exercise control “directly and immediately.” Browning-Ferris at 1. Instead, indirect control, “such as through an intermediary,” could suffice to establish joint employment. Id. The key was that an alleged joint employer had the authority to exercise control, and therefore it could do so at any moment.

In Hy-Brand I, the NLRB reversed Browning-Ferris by a 3-2 vote. It affirmed the finding by the administrative law judge (ALJ) that the companies at issue were joint employers under the NLRA, but it went on to address the legal standard that the ALJ used. It found the Browning-Ferris standard to be “a distortion of common law,” “contrary to the [NLRA],” and “ill-advised as a matter of policy.” Hy-Brand I at 2. It restored the earlier standard, holding that joint employers must “have actually exercised joint control over essential employment terms” and that “the control must be direct and immediate” rather than “limited and routine.” Id. at 35.

The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is the federal government agency responsible for enforcing the statute dealing with labor organizing and unfair labor practices. It consists of a five-member board and a General Counsel (GC), all of whom are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Complaints of labor law violations are first heard by an administrative law judge (ALJ). The board hears appeals of ALJ decisions, with the GC acting as prosecutor. The Senate recently confirmed two new NLRB appointees, giving Republicans a 3-2 majority for the first time in years. A decision issued by the NLRB in December 2017 seems to support claims that the new board will take a much more “pro-business” approach. The decision in UPMC, 365 NLRB No. 153 (2017), reverses a 2016 ruling that dealt with the NLRB’s authority to impose an employer’s settlement offer over the objections of both the charging party and the GC.

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) protects workers’ rights to engage in activities related to organizing for the purpose of collective bargaining. Workers alleging unfair labor practices and other violations of the NLRA may file a complaint with the NLRB. As with many administrative proceedings, the case first goes before an ALJ, who may conduct a trial and issue a ruling. A party can then appeal the ALJ’s ruling to the board. Prior to 2016, ALJs had considerable discretion regarding the disposition of cases. This was a key issue in the UPMC case.

A 2016 decision from the NLRB, U.S. Postal Service, 364 NLRB No. 116, effectively ended an earlier practice that allowed ALJs to impose a settlement offered by a respondent, without the charging party’s or GC’s agreement, if the ALJ determined that the settlement offer was reasonable. The NLRB first allowed this in Electronic Workers IUE Local 201 (General Electric Co.), 188 NLRB 855 (1971), when an ALJ approved a settlement offer as though it were a consent order. The ALJ found that “further hearing herein…could not result in any changes in the proposed Consent Order and Notice,” and the proposed settlement “would be more favorable to the General Counsel and Charging Party” despite their lack of consent. Id. at 857.

Federal labor law, primarily through the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), protects the right of employees to engage in various activities related to organizing for the purpose of collective bargaining. This includes actions directly related to organizing and “concerted activities” that involve matters of concern to employees. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) investigates alleged violations of workers’ rights under the NLRA. An administrative law judge (ALJ) with the NLRB recently ruled in favor of a group of workers who alleged that their employer unlawfully fired them because of an email exchange that criticized the employer and some of its managers. Mexican Radio Corp., Case No. 02-CA-168989 (NLRB, N.Y. Office, Apr. 26, 2017). The ALJ ruled that the workers were engaging in concerted activity protected by the NLRA.

Among other rights, the NLRA protects workers’ right “to engage in…concerted activities for the purpose of…mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157. Employers may not “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees” who are exercising their rights under the NLRA. Id. at § 158(a)(1). The NLRA defines “protected concerted activities” very broadly. It protects workers in this regard even if they are not members of a labor union. Workers are not obligated under this provision to “present a specific demand upon their employer to remedy a condition they find objectionable.” Labor Board v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962). In that case, the Supreme Court found that the workers’ lack of a bargaining representative, combined with immediate circumstances, required them “to speak for themselves as best they could.” Id.

The respondent in Mexican Radio Corp. operates a restaurant. According to the ALJ’s written decision, three employees made a concerted complaint to the respondent in early October 2015 regarding their work schedules and other employment-related issues. In late October, the three employees, along with a fourth employee, responded to a group email sent by a former employee who had recently resigned. The former employee addressed concerns about work schedules, tip policies, and complaints about a specific manager in the email. The four employees expressed support and agreement with many of the allegations. On the following day, the respondent reprimanded and then terminated all four employees.

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The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., protects a wide range of activities by employees related to organizing for collective bargaining and other purposes. Whether or not a particular individual is an “employee” within the meaning of the NLRA is a critically important component of determining whether the statute applies. This has been a contentious issue on college and university campuses around the country in recent years. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has issued several opinions affecting people who work, or who perform services that resemble “work,” for colleges and universities, including faculty members, student assistants, and scholarship athletes. A memorandum issued by the NLRB General Counsel in late January, identified as GC 17-01, offers new guidance in light of three of these decisions. While the memorandum does not have the force of law, it could have an impact on future decisions by both the NLRB and the courts.

Employees have the right to “self-organization” under the NLRA, which includes forming or joining labor unions and engaging in “concerted activities” aimed at collective bargaining or “other mutual aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157. The plain language of the statute indicates that employers are only obligated to respect this right for “employees.” The NLRA’s basic definition of “employee” as “any employee…not…limited to the employees of a particular employer” is not very helpful. Id. at § 152(3). The statute identifies specific exclusions from the definition of “employee,” such as agricultural laborers and independent contractors, but it offers little guidance otherwise. The task of identifying who falls under the statute’s definition has mostly fallen to the NLRB, and the university environment has shown the difficulty of defining the term.

The first case cited by the NLRB counsel involved the board’s jurisdiction over private colleges and universities that identify themselves as religious in nature. Pacific Lutheran University, 361 NLRB No. 157 (Dec. 16, 2014). The U.S. Supreme Court had determined that church-operated schools were not subject to the NLRB’s jurisdiction in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). The Pacific Lutheran decision modified the NLRB’s earlier interpretation of the Supreme Court ruling, finding that the school must establish that “First Amendment religious rights…are even implicated” before claiming a religious exemption. Pacific Lutheran at 6.

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