Articles Posted in NLRB Decisions

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., protects workers’ right to engage in various activities related to organizing for the purpose of collective bargaining. In early 2016, an administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of a worker who alleged that his employer terminated him, in part, because of critical messages posted to the social media platform Twitter. The employer claimed that the employee had violated its social media policy. The ALJ ordered the employee’s reinstatement and further ordered the employer to rescind its social media policy and other policies, finding them to be in violation of the NLRA. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) affirmed the ALJ’s ruling. Chipotle Services LLC et al., No. 04-CA-147314, ALJ dec. (NLRB, Mar. 14, 2016); 364 NLRB No. 72 (Aug. 18, 2016).

Employees’ “right to self organization,” to collective bargaining, and to “concerted activities” directed towards these goals are commonly known as “Section 7 rights,” after § 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157. An employer engages in “unfair labor practices” when it “interfere[s] with” or “restrain[s]” an employee’s efforts to exercise those rights. NLRA § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). The internet, social media, and other new communications technologies have vastly expanded opportunities for concerted activities protected by § 7. The NLRB has addressed numerous disputes over which, if any, restraints employers may place on employees’ use of social media.

The respondent in the Chipotle case operates a nationwide chain of restaurants. According to the ALJ’s ruling, it required employees to abide by a “social media code of conduct” that prohibited “disparaging, false, misleading, harassing or discriminatory statements about or relating to” the employer and other parties. Chipotle, ALJ dec. at 4. The employer stated that it reserved the right to “ take disciplinary action, up to and including termination,” for violations of this policy. Id.

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The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., protects the right of workers to organize for the purpose of collective bargaining with their employers. It prohibits discrimination or retaliation for engaging in union-related activities, as well as interference with those activities. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is responsible for enforcing these protections, as well as ruling on disputes between employees and employers. A recent NLRB decision found that an employer engaged in unfair labor practices by terminating an employee for testifying before a legislative committee. Oncor Electric Delivery Co., 364 NLRB No. 58 (Jul. 29, 2016). The employer argued that the employee’s testimony was an individual act, rather than “concerted activity” protected by the NLRA. It further claimed that termination was justified because of “malicious falsehoods” in the employee’s testimony. Id. at 2. The NLRB rejected the employer’s arguments and ruled in the employee’s favor.

Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA prohibits employers from using disparate treatment or other forms of discrimination to “encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). In order to demonstrate a violation of § 8(a)(3), an aggrieved employee must establish that they were engaging in activity protected by the NLRA, including both direct union activity and “concerted activity.” See NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157. They must also show a causal connection between the employee’s protected activity and the employer’s adverse action. The NLRB calls this a Wright Line analysis, after Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 495 U.S. 989 (1982).

The Wright Line analysis requires an employee to establish four elements:  (1) their conduct was protected under the NLRA; (2) their employer knew about or suspected the employee’s conduct; (3) the employer “harbored animus” toward the employee because of the conduct; and (4) the employer took an adverse action against the employee because of this animus. Oncor at 22.

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Smartphones, mobile devices with an ever-expanding list of capabilities that make the “phone” part seem like an afterthought, have become a common feature of daily life throughout the U.S. Most smartphones include cameras capable of taking both pictures and video, often with better quality than some of the best digital cameras of a few years ago. This feature has made smartphones an indispensable tool in a wide range of legal matters, from police brutality investigations to employment law cases. The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) recently found that an employer violated federal law by barring employees from using smartphones to take pictures or make recordings without permission. Whole Foods Market Group, Inc., et al., 363 NLRB No. 87 (Dec. 24, 2015). The policy, while perhaps not originally intended to do so, prevented workers from documenting workplace conditions that violate federal or state employment laws.

The NLRB investigates and adjudicates alleged violations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the federal statute that protects the right of workers to organize for collective bargaining and other purposes, and to engage in other “concerted activities” aimed at protecting workers’ rights. 29 U.S.C. § 157. In the present case, the NLRB was investigating whether a policy prohibiting smartphone use constituted “interfer[ence] with, restrain[t], or coerc[ion of] employees in the exercise of [their] rights” to engage in concerted activity. 29 U.S.C. § 158.

The use of smartphones to take photographs and record videos in the workplace, and to record conversations among employees or between employees and supervisors, can assist employees and their advocates in building a case under various employment statutes. This might include, for example, an audio recording of a supervisor making derogatory statements about employees of a certain race, sex, or religion, used in support of a claim for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. The NLRA protects these activities, but wiretap statutes present a separate challenge.

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The digital newsroom at the cable and satellite news network Al Jazeera America (AJAM) voted on whether to unionize in late September 2015. A tally of the votes in early October showed that the vote was overwhelmingly in favor of unionizing, with 32 people voting in favor and five voting against. The journalists will become members of the News Guild of New York (NGNY), which has represented print journalists since the 1930s and has recently begun a major effort to support digital journalists who want to organize. Digital journalists at web publications like Salon, Gawker, and Vice have also recently voted to unionize. AJAM opposed the journalists’ unionization vote and has announced its intention to dispute the eligibility of some who participated in the vote.

The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., protects the right of employees to organize in order to engage in collective bargaining with the management of their employers. See 29 U.S.C. § 157. The law applies to most employers in the country, defining “employer” as almost any person or organization that employs people, except for the U.S. government, state and local governments, Federal Reserve Banks, and businesses subject to the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.). 29 U.S.C. § 152(2). Labor unions, when they act as employers, are also subject to the NLRA. The law created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to enforce its provisions.

AJAM, which is headquartered in Manhattan, launched in 2013 as a competitor to cable news networks like CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC. On September 3, 2015, a majority of employees in the network’s digital newsroom asked the company to voluntarily recognize the NGNY as their representative for collective bargaining purposes. Employees described “a troubling lack of transparency, inconsistent management, and lack of clear redress” from their employer. After several weeks, the company reportedly declined to grant the requested recognition to the union, which led to the employees’ vote.

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The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., protects the rights of private-sector workers to organize into unions, to engage in collective bargaining, and to take collective action when needed. The law generally provides workers with a cause of action against their employers for violations of the NLRA. Employees of companies that are franchisees of a much larger company, or that are under contract with another company, may find their rights under the NLRA limited because of how the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has interpreted the word “employer” in recent years. In August 2015, the NLRB ruled that a company and its subcontractor were “joint employers” of the subcontractor’s employees for purposes of the NLRA. Browning-Ferris Industries of Cal., Inc., et al. (“Browning-Ferris II“), 362 NLRB No. 186 (2015).

The NLRB held in its recent ruling that it had established a general standard for joint employment over 30 years ago, based on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Pa., Inc. (“Browning-Ferris I“), 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982). The central question is whether the two companies “share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and conditions of employment.” Id. at 1123. Since 1982, the NLRB has “imposed additional requirements for finding joint-employer status” that, according to the NLRB, have no legal basis or justification. Browning-Ferris II at 1.

The respondents in the present case are a waste management company (WMC) and a staffing company (SC). The WMC operates a recycling facility that receives about 1,200 tons of material per day that must be sorted into waste, recyclable material, and usable commodities. It directly employs about 60 people, most of whom work outside the facility and who already have union representation. The SC, under a contract with the WMC, provides about 240 workers to work in the plant itself. The contract states that the workers are solely the employees of the SC. The union is seeking to represent these workers.
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Many well-known businesses, particularly restaurant chains, use the franchise model to operate national, or even international, chains of locations. Under this model, the franchise owner enters into agreements with other businesses to operate locations using the franchise’s brand name. These businesses, known as franchisees, must abide by a wide range of requirements under the franchise agreement. Employees of individual franchise locations are considered employees of the franchisee, but multiple complaints and lawsuits in recent years have sought to hold a franchisor liable for acts of a franchisee, based on the theory that the franchise agreement gives the franchisor substantial control over the franchisee’s business. A recent lawsuit against the McDonald’s franchisor asserts that it is liable for race discrimination by a franchisee. Betts, et al v. McDonald’s Corp., et al., No. 4:15-cv-00002, complaint (W.D. Va., Jan. 22, 2015).

The plaintiffs are African-American former employees of a company that operates three McDonald’s restaurants in Clarkesville and South Boston, Virginia. They describe a lengthy sequence of events involving alleged racial and sexual harassment and discrimination by managers employed by the franchisee, culminating in an allegedly overt decision to “reduce the number of African-American employees.” Betts, complaint at 28. All but one of the plaintiffs state that they were terminated on May 12, 2014. The other plaintiff alleges that the company constructively discharged her on July 5, 2014, after “months of racial abuse.” Id. at 32.

The plaintiffs filed suit against the franchisee, several individual managers, and the franchisors. They are asserting seven causes of action, including claims for wrongful termination, constructive discharge, and racial harassment under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and sexual harassment under Title VII.
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The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) issued a final rule in December 2014 addressing the process by which workers may vote on whether or not to form a union or seek representation by an existing union. 79 Fed. Reg. 74307 (Dec. 15, 2014). The agency, which is charged with enforcing the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., states that the new rule “remove[s] unnecessary barriers to the fair and expeditious resolution of representation questions.” The rule appears to increase unions’ leverage in disputes with businesses over questions of worker representation. Critics call it the “quickie election” rule, and several business organizations are already challenging it in court.

Employees have the right under the NLRA to organize or choose representatives for collective bargaining purposes, or to refrain from this sort of activity. 29 U.S.C. § 157. Employers are prohibited from “interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing], or coerc[ing] employees in the exercise of [these] rights.” Id. at § 158(a)(1). If workers and employers cannot reach an agreement regarding the terms of organizing or representation, the NLRB is authorized to resolve the dispute. Id. at § 159. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the NLRB has broad discretion in these types of disputes. 79 Fed. Reg. at 74308, citing NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946), et al.

The NLRA establishes a four-step process for representation disputes: (1) an employee, labor organization, or employer files a petition with the NLRB; (2) the NLRB, or an NLRB regional director, holds a hearing to determine if the petition presents a representation question; (3) an NLRB unit conducts a secret-ballot election; and (4) the NLRB certifies the election results. The statute only provides the basic steps, though, and the NLRB’s experience has shown problems “which cannot be solved without changing current practices and rules.” 79 Fed. Reg. at 74308.
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The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) recently affirmed a prior ruling holding that it has jurisdiction to enforce the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. in a dispute involving a Michigan casino operated by an Indian tribe. Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort, et al, No. 07-CA-053586. An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that the casino violated a former employee’s rights under the NLRA. The tribe, the Saginaw Chippewa Tribal Nation, has denied that the NLRB has jurisdiction over it because of tribal sovereignty. The U.S. government recognizes hundreds of Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations,” with a degree of sovereignty over their own members. Tribal law is incredibly complicated, but the question presented in this case is relatively simple: does the NLRA, a federal statute, apply to a business owned and operated by an Indian tribe? At least one federal circuit court of appeals has held that it does, and courts have held that other statutes are binding on tribes.

A former employee of the Soaring Eagle Casino filed a complaint with the NLRB in 2011, claiming that she was fired for soliciting support among her co-workers for a union. An ALJ ruled in the employee’s favor in March 2012, dismissing the tribe’s argument that the NLRA should not apply to activities at the casino. The casino is located on land that belongs to the tribe under treaties ratified in 1855 and 1864, but the complainant argued that because the casino is not “an essential Government operation of the Tribe,” it should be subject to the NLRA. Soaring Eagle, ALJ Decision at 7 (March 26, 2012).

The ALJ noted that statutes of “general application” may apply to individual tribal members, Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960), and that the NLRB has found the NLRA to be such a statute. He concluded that the casino is engaged in commerce as defined by the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), (6)-(7). Prior cases have reached similar decisions. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the NLRA applies to a casino operated on tribal land in San Manuel Indian Bingo and Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Another court held that the Occupational Health and Safety Act applies to commercial activities on tribal land. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985).
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Employees of numerous major fast-food restaurant chains have mounted campaigns to improve their working conditions, including higher wages and fewer unpaid hours. A major hurdle for these campaigns has been the franchise model used by many chain restaurants, in which one company, the “franchisor,” owns the restaurant’s brand, logo, menu, and other intellectual property, while other companies, “franchisees,” operate the actual restaurants. This has created what has been called the “fissured workplace,” since it often limits any legal claims employees can make to the franchisee that operates the restaurant where they work. The General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), however, recently announced that it will treat McDonald’s USA, LLC, the franchisor of McDonald’s restaurants, and its franchisees as “joint employers.” This means that employees may file complaints against both the individual franchisee that employs them and the franchisor.

In a franchise system, a franchisor enters into agreements with franchisees to operate one or more business locations. The franchise agreement includes various requirements that the franchisees must follow related to branding, marketing, and business operations. Employment issues are often left to the individual franchisees, at least according to the written agreements. Since workers at individual business locations are employed by a franchisee, they cannot assert claims directly against the franchisor. A major criticism of this system is that the terms of franchise agreements have expanded in scope, to the point that they often have direct effects on employment matters. The franchisors, however, remain shielded from liability to the franchisees’ employees.

The NLRB’s Office of the General Counsel (OGC) decided in July 2014 to allow workers to file complaints against both their employer and the national franchisor. At the time of this announcement, the NLRB had received 181 complaints against McDonald’s franchisees since November 2012. While 64 complaints were still under investigation, it had already found 43 of them to have merit. If the NLRB is unable to settle the meritorious complaints, it may file lawsuits naming the individual franchisees and the franchisor as defendants.
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Adjunct professors, generally defined as non-tenure-track and part-time, are becoming increasingly common at two- and four-year colleges and universities around the country. As their numbers grow, however, they are struggling with a lack of job security, low pay, and few benefits. Some of them are successfully demanding better treatment, and several unions are offering their support and assistance. They face some difficult legal obstacles, however, including Supreme Court precedent that limits the applicability of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and claims by some schools that more recent Supreme Court decisions allow them to prevent their adjunct professors from holding union elections.

An article published by Al-Jazeera America in July 2014 describes the experiences of several adjunct professors and describes how faculty employment has changed in recent years. Approximately 30 percent of the 1.8 million faculty members employed by U.S. colleges and universities hold tenure-track positions, meaning that their position offers them the possibility of promotion to “full” professor with a very high degree of job security. Only 24 percent of faculty members actually have tenure, a decrease from about 45 percent in the 1970s.
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